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Same-Sex Marriage and Taxes 
 
Stephen T. Black

 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
―Ann, I‘ve examined your last three years‘ tax returns . . . will you 
marry me?‖ 
―Oh, Andy, I thought you‘d never ask! I‘m so looking forward to the 
tax benefits we will enjoy together.‖ 
―Yes, and when we have children we have even more deductions. 
We should marry as soon as possible!‖ 
Our tax system, while frequently criticized for its complexity, has the 
flexibility to encourage or influence behavior. It is used to try to 
influence people‘s spending habits to ―jump-start‖ the economy or 
encourage businesses to buy more fixed assets. 
Tax law may even help to channel marital and family decisions. 
Frequently the proponents of same-sex marriage cite the difference in tax 
treatment as one of the reasons that same-sex couples receive 
discriminatory treatment.
1
 
 
Marriage can affect a person‘s eligibility for federal benefits such as 
Social Security. Married couples may incur higher or lower federal tax 
liabilities than they would as single individuals. In all, the General 
Accounting Office has counted 1,138 statutory provisions—ranging 
from the obvious cases just mentioned to the obscure (landowners‘ 
 
 Professor of Law, Franklin Pierce Law Center. J.D. 1994, Brigham Young University; LL.M. 2000, 
University of Washington. I thank Professor Lynn Wardle and The Marriage & Family Law 
Research Project at the J. Reuben Clark Law School of Brigham Young University for the invitation 
to participate in this Symposium. I offer further thanks to Jana Black and Kathy Black for their 
invaluable comments on earlier drafts and Tony Palizzi and Steven Pippenger who provided research 
assistance. I acknowledge the financial support provided by Franklin Pierce Law Center. 
 1. E.g., Goodridge v. Mass. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (stating that 
the majority of governments around the world, including the United States, have not given 
homosexual couples the same rights as traditional relationships in dealing with income and 
inheritance tax benefits. This inequality has created a second class status of same-sex relationships.); 
HOPE LOZANO-BIELAT & DAVID MASCI, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: REDEFINING MARRIAGE AROUND 
THE WORLD (2007), http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=235 (last visited July 11, 2007); NAT‘L ORG. 
FOR WOMEN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IS A FEMINIST ISSUE (2004), http://www.now.org/issues 
/lgbi/marr-rep.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2008); . 
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eligibility to negotiate a surface-mine lease with the Secretary of 
Labor)—in which marital status is a factor in determining or receiving 
―benefits, rights, and privileges.‖
2
 
 
The tax code contains provisions that benefit only married individuals 
and families. These benefits provide hundreds to thousands of dollars in 
tax relief to individuals, but only if those individuals fall into prescribed 
categories. 
Part II of this article will explore those categories, and the extent to 
which the preference for married couples with children furthers one of 
the goals of society, which is to perpetuate itself. The range of benefits 
points to an interesting focus: the tax law actively encourages marriage, 
and especially marriage between opposite gender individuals who appear 
capable of having children. In fact, one of the largest benefits of the tax 
system is only available to those couples with children.
3
 
Part III examines the treatment a same-sex couple receives under 
current tax law. The effect is discriminatory and real: same-sex couples 
are treated as unrelated third parties to each other, and all transactions 
between the couple are potentially taxable. When contrasted with the 
same transactions between a married couple, the difference can be stark. 
Part IV addresses the issue of functionally equivalent families—that 
is, non-traditional, family-like arrangements that perform similar 
functions to traditional families. This part will explore whether other 
types of ―family‖ arrangements should qualify for the same tax benefits 
as traditional families. It will analyze the purpose behind the family tax 
benefits and whether there is really a functional equivalent to a 
traditional family. 
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) prevents same-sex couples 
from claiming family tax benefits. Part V examines what would happen 
if the Act were repealed or found to be unconstitutional. Without the Act, 
the federal tax would depend on each state‘s definition of marriage. 
There have been previous instances where federal tax consequences were 
predicated on state law. The resulting disparity between similarly 
situated persons residing in different states required Congressional 
action, and it seems likely that the absence of DOMA would require the 
same. 
 
 2. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE POTENTIAL BUDGETARY IMPACT OF RECOGNIZING SAME-
SEX MARRIAGES (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/55xx/doc5559/06-21-
SameSexMarriage.pdf (quoting General Accounting Office, Defense of Marriage Act: Update to 
Prior Report, GAO-04-353R (Jan. 23, 2004)). 
 3. The child tax credit is scored at over $42 trillion for 2007. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND 
BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 296 (2007) (Tax Expenditures). 
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Part VI answers the question, ―Isn‘t this unlawful discrimination?,‖ 
in the negative. A long history of cases claiming equal protection 
violations teaches that the courts are reluctant to second-guess the 
legislatures in matters of taxation. In fact, tax discrimination is accorded 
rational-basis scrutiny, so that it is only necessary for a tax rule to have 
some rational goal to be upheld. Given the purpose of society to 
perpetuate itself, it seems that constitutional challenges to the traditional 
family bias of the tax code are doomed to fail. 
 
II.  THE TAX LAW PREFERS HETEROSEXUAL FAMILIES 
 
A.  Tax Benefits 
 
1.  Marriage penalties and bonuses 
 
Consider the tale of Ann and Andy, Betty and Bob, and Clyde.
4
 Ann 
and Andy are married; Betty and Bob are not, but live together; Clyde is 
a single individual. Ann and Andy make $60,000 and are entitled to a 
$10,700 standard deduction and two dependency exemptions of $3,400 
each for taxable income of $42,500 ($60,000 - $10,700 - $6,800). Their 
tax is $1,565 + .15($42,500 - $15,650) = $5,593 (rounded up). Although 
Betty and Bob live together, they are not married, thus each is considered 
single. Betty will be entitled to a standard deduction of $5,350 and a 
personal exemption of $3,400 for taxable income of $36,250 ($45,000 - 
$5,350 - $3,400). Her tax will be $4,386.25 + .25($36,250 - $31,850) = 
$5,486. Notice some of Betty‘s income is taxed at a 25% bracket 
whereas Ann and Andy‘s income is taxed at a maximum of 15%. Bob 
will also be entitled to a standard deduction of $5,350 and a personal 
exemption of $3,400 for taxable income of $6,250 ($15,000 - $5,350 - 
$3,400). His tax will be $625 (all taxed at 10%). Clyde will be entitled to 
a standard deduction of $5,350 and a personal exemption of $3,400 for 
taxable income of $51,250 ($60,000 - $5,350 - $3,400). His tax will be 
$4,386.25 + .25($51,250 - $31,850) = $9,236. Clyde will have $19,400 
of his income taxed at 25%. Betty had only $4,400 of her income taxed 
at 25% and none of Ann and Andy‘s income was taxed at 25%. These 
differences are a function of the ―tax brackets‖ and the filing status 
(married or not) of the parties. Their incomes and tax liability are set 
forth below: 
 
 
 
 4. All tax calculations were done using preliminary 2007 tables. 
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Taxpayer Income Tax 
Ann $0 $0 
Andy $60,000 $5,593 
 
Betty $45,000 $5,486 
Bob $15,000 + $   625 
  = $6,111 
 
Clyde $60,000 $9,236 
 
Ann and Andy pay the lowest amount of tax. This is due, in part, to the 
fact that married couples who file jointly are allowed to split their 
income for tax purposes. This income splitting allows Ann and Andy to 
take advantage of the progressive rate structure of the Code—as a 
taxpayer makes more money, the tax rate goes up. Income splitting 
―pretends‖ that each party earned one-half of the income. Because each 
earns one-half, neither makes enough to get into a higher tax bracket. 
The tax rate increase is not continual; rather, the increase is stepped 
in brackets. By taking advantage of income splitting, Ann and Andy have 
effectively moved some of Andy‘s income from a high tax bracket into 
Ann‘s lower (and unused) tax bracket. 
This can be readily seen by comparing Betty and Bob‘s tax liability. 
While the couple also has $60,000 of income, their tax is slightly higher 
by $518 ($6,111 - $5,593). Since Betty and Bob are not married, they 
cannot take advantage of income splitting. As a result, Betty‘s income 
crosses into the 25% bracket, and the couple‘s combined tax is higher 
than if they were married.
5
 This result is called a marriage bonus. Were 
Betty and Bob to get married, they would save $518 on their taxes. 
Finally, consider Clyde‘s tax liability. He makes the same amount as 
does Andy, or the joint incomes of Betty and Bob, yet Clyde pays the 
most tax. If Clyde were to find a willing woman and get married, his 
marriage bonus would be $3,643 (assuming that his wife had $0 income). 
Now consider two more couples. Dara and Dan are married, but 
Emma and Ed are not: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5. If Betty and Bob were each to make $30,000, there would be no bonus—they would pay 
the same amount as Ann and Andy. 
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Taxpayer Income Tax 
 
Dara $0 
Dan $160,000 $28,893 
 
Emma $80,000 $14,236 
Ed $80,000      +  $14,236 
                    = $28,472 
 
If Emma and Ed were to marry, their tax liability would increase. The 
$421 difference is called a marriage penalty. 
Dara and Dan compute their income as follows: $160,000 – $10,700 
(standard deduction) – $6,800 (2 personal exemptions of $3,400 each) = 
$142,500. The tax is $24,972 + $3,920 (.28($142,500 – 128,500)). They 
have $14,000 taxed at the 28% bracket. Emma and Ed each compute 
their income as follows: $80,000 - $5,350 (standard deduction) - $3,400 
(personal exemption) = $71,250. The tax for each is $4,386 + $9,850 
(.25($71,250 - $31,850)) = $14,236. Since there are two of them, the 
combined tax would be $14,236 x 2 = $28,472. Notice they have no 
income taxed at the 28% bracket. Thus, Dara and Dan will pay $421 
more. This extra money is from the $14,000 that was taxed at 3% more 
(28% vs. 25%). 
 
2.  Why bonuses or penalties? 
 
The tax code has long been viewed as a vehicle for social change.
6
 In 
1975, Professor Bittker stated, ―[a] persistent problem in the theory of 
income taxation is whether natural persons should be taxed as isolated 
individuals, or as social beings whose family ties to other taxpayers 
affect their taxpaying capacity.‖7 Prior to 1938, the answer was that each 
spouse was their own tax individual. 
 
The original income tax laws, however, made no provision for joint 
filing, so that husbands and wives completed their own tax returns on 
their individual earnings. The story took a markedly different turn with 
the escalation of progressive marginal rates during World War I. 
 
 6. See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. & Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency and Tax 
Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 39 (2006) (―However, 
policymakers have also increasingly relied on the tax code rather than direct government 
expenditures to subsidize households and influence their behavior as a result of perceived or real 
incentives within the tax legislative process . . . .‖). 
 7. Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1391 
(1975). 
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Because such rates rise with income, it is better to have two persons 
each earning $30,000 than one person earning $60,000. Spouses in the 
typical unequal-earning marriage first tried to acquire this benefit by 
private contractual agreement (e.g., the husband would sign a document 
ceding half of his income to his wife), but were thwarted by a Supreme 
Court opinion holding that income must be taxed to ―the man who 
earned it.‖ But under a later Court ruling in the same year, Poe v. 
Seaborn, spouses in community property states were automatically able 
to get this ―income-splitting‖ benefit.
8
 
 
Taxes usually should play no appreciable part in family planning.
9
 
However, Congress also thought it would be fair to have progressive 
rates so that as income increased, so did an individual‘s tax burden. 
These two ideas clashed, but if a state had community property laws, its 
citizens were better off. Pre-1948 there was no joint filing. This meant 
that working wives (during and following WWII) were taxed at the 
family‘s marginal rate. Each dollar they earned was added on top of any 
other income the family earned, while an unmarried woman‘s earnings 
were taxed beginning at the lowest rates. 
 
A remarkable bit of social history followed. Because community 
property rules now generated a tax benefit, a flurry of states reformed 
their laws, generally by giving wives the minimal rights needed to 
satisfy the Supreme Court‘s standards. Congress sought to level the 
playing field between community property and other states by 
overruling Seaborn. Congress first moved to equalize matters, however, 
during World War II, when the revenue needs led to a proposal to tax 
all married couples as if they were a single unmarried person. This, of 
course, would make it a tax burden to be married anywhere, as long as 
both spouses had some personal income, because one spouse‘s income 
would simply be added on top of the other‘s, with no offsetting benefit 
in the rate structure. This proposal was met by a storm of protests, 
labeling the possibility of mandatory joint filing ―un-American‖ and 
―antiwomen.‖ 
Seven years later, in 1948, another proposal was made for 
mandatory joint filing, this time at rates set equal to twice what a single 
person earning half the total familial income would pay; the community 
property regime would be adopted, in essence, for federal tax purposes 
 
 8. Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender 
Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 989 (1993) (citation omitted). 
 9. Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax 
Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 725-27 (2007). 
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(i.e., all income was to be split between spouses). This change was 
widely praised, and soon after its enactment, the nouveau community 
property states all reverted to their former equitable interest laws. States 
were willing to change their nontax laws to get tax benefits for 
traditional, single-earning families. The quick repeal of these property 
laws after 1948 demonstrate that the new-found thinking regarding 
property rights was tax driven.
10
 
 
The history of joint filing also shows that how society feels about ―the 
family‖ can largely influence the tax policy. Over the years, Americans 
have had to balance the progressivity of the Code with the impact it has 
had on families. 
 
3.  Specific benefits 
 
a.  Head of household. Congress created the ―head of household‖ 
category for tax purposes in 1951.
11
 Most single taxpayers maintaining a 
home for the benefit of a dependent are providing benefits to society in 
terms of raising children and, therefore, should receive some of the 
benefits of tax reduction that married couples obtain through income 
splitting. 
 
Essentially, the definition of a ―head of household‖ is an unmarried 
individual, including one who is legally separated, who maintains a 
household for the entire year for a dependent. Single taxpayers having 
no dependents are not in a comparable position. The difference in 
income tax rates is not related to customary household expenditure. It 
is, rather, recognition of the extra costs incurred in maintaining children 
or other dependents.
12
 
 
Returning to our couple Ann and Andy, assume that they have had 
two children. Compare their tax liability with Francine, a single parent of 
two children: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 10. Id. at 989–90. 
 11. Pub. L. No. 183, 82d Cong., 1st Session (1951). 
 12. U.S. Dep‘t of Treas., FAQs: Filing Statutes for Federal Income Taxes, 
http://www.treas.gov/education/faq/taxes/filing-status.shtml (last visited Jan. 31, 2008). 
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Taxpayer Income Tax Tax w/o Children 
Ann $0 
Andy $60,000 $2,573 $5,593 
 
Betty $45,000 $1,483 
Bob $15,000      + $   625 
 = $2,108 $6111 
 
Francine $60,000 $3,733 $9,236 
 
Notice that compared to their liability before having children, Ann and 
Andy have to pay $3,020 less. Also note that compared to Clyde (the 
single taxpayer), Francine‘s tax is $5,503 lower.13 The calculations are 
the same as in the first example, except the family has two additional 
dependency exemptions in the amount of $3,400 each, and two $1,000 
child tax credits which reduce their tax liability dollar for dollar. Also 
note that an assumption was made to give both dependency exemptions 
and child tax credits to Betty rather than Bob, since they would not have 
been effective if given to Bob. Notice that compared to their liability 
before having children, Ann and Andy have to pay $3,020 less ($5,563 - 
$2,000 child tax credits – .15($3,400 x 2) dependency exemptions). Also 
note that compared to Clyde (the single taxpayer), Francine‘s tax is 
$5,503 lower ($2,000 in child tax credits, $1,904 ($6,800 x .28) for 
dependency exemptions, $700 (.28($7,850 - $5,350)) difference between 
the standard deduction for a head of household as opposed to a single 
person, and $899 due to expanded brackets which tax more income at a 
lesser rate).
14
 The tax law implicitly promotes traditional marriage. While 
Francine is much better off for taxation purposes than Clyde, she pays 
$1,160 more than do Ann and Andy, who have the same amount of 
income. Stated another way, if Francine were to find a willing man (with 
$0 income), the U.S. government would subsidize her with $1,160 in 
lower taxes every year.
15
 
Consider the case of Betty and Bob. Compared with life before 
children, they pay $4,003 less. We made the assumption that Betty got to 
claim both children. Notice that Betty‘s tax has dropped from $5,486 to 
$1,483 ($2,000 in child tax credits, $1,460 (.25($4,400) + .15($2,400)), 
 
 13. Like death, childbearing is not a suggested tool for tax-planning. 
 14. Like death, childbearing is not a suggested tool for tax-planning. 
 15. It can be argued that this is simply in recognition of having an extra person in the family. 
However, note that the personal exemption for 2007 is $3,400, and the tax savings from that 
exemption is only $510. Therefore, the extra $650 is beyond the amount Congress intended to 
exempt for extra family members. 
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$375 (.15($7,850 - $5,350)) increase in the standard deduction from a 
single person to a head of household, and $168 in change of bracket size 
reducing the amount of income taxed at a lower rate; thus, all of the 
decrease is due to Betty‘s tax change). 
This drop in Betty‘s tax will negate the principal reason for the 
marriage bonus they would have seen as a childless couple.
16
 Now that 
they have children, the marriage bonus changes to a $465 marriage 
penalty. However, this change does not contradict the fact that the tax 
law contains a preference for traditional families, as much as it shows 
that the law contains a generous bonus for those having children over 
those who do not. 
Betty and Bob are not similarly situated to Ann and Andy. While the 
two couples nominally make the same amount of money, Ann and Andy 
are free to transfer their funds between the two of them without tax cost. 
When the couple buys a home, there is no imputed gift from one to the 
other. When the non-earner spouse takes money from the checking 
account to buy food or pay rent, there is no imputed compensation. 
Nevertheless, for Betty and Bob, the same is not true.
17
 If Bob pays 
$400 per month to Betty to help defray the grocery bill, for example, the 
tax law treats that as a payment between two unrelated persons. What is 
the nature of that payment? Was it a gift? Was it compensation for 
services? Was it a sale? 
Rent paid by Bob to Betty would be includable in her income, and 
subject to the rules for renting a home, Betty should have deductions.
18
 
However, does the arrangement contemplate room and board? If so, is 
Bob paying for the provision and storage of food (a service) or for the 
food itself (inventory)? Does Betty have $4800 more income, and Bob 
no deduction?
19
 This transaction alone could increase Betty and Bob‘s 
combined income to $64,800, and every time the couple shares chores, 
cash, or an apartment, the potential income increases.
20
 
As a result, Betty and Bob are really not in the same position as Ann 
and Andy. In fact, because of that one transaction alone, Betty and Bob‘s 
tax would be as follows: 
 
 
 
 16. Their marriage bonus (or the fact that they paid higher taxes than a similar married 
couple) was due to the fact that they could not engage in income splitting, and Betty‘s income 
pushed her into a higher tax bracket. With the advent of children, her income is now taxed in that 
lower bracket once again. 
 17. See infra Part III.B. 
 18. I.R.C. § 280A (Lexis 2008). 
 19. Resulting in ―double‖ taxation of the $4800. 
 20. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (as amended in 2003). 
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Betty $49,800 $2,203 
Bob $15,000 + $   625 
  = $2,828 
 
Tax Before – ($2,108) 
 
Increase = $   720 
 
Compared with Ann and Andy, they are worse off by $255 (Betty 
and Bob‘s new tax of $2,828—Ann and Andy‘s tax of $2,573). This is 
due to the marriage ―perk‖ of being treated as a single economic unit, 
and not having to compute imputed income due to transfers or exchanges 
of services between the couple. This ―perk‖ has been embedded in the 
tax law at least since 1928, and demonstrates the strong bias the tax code 
has for married couples.
21
 
 
b.  Qualifying child. The filing status changes to the tax rates are not 
the only benefits to taxpayers with children. A ―qualifying child‖ may 
enable a taxpayer to claim other tax benefits, such as the exemption for a 
dependent, the child tax credit, the child and dependent care credit, and 
the earned income tax credit. Prior to 2005, each of these items may have 
defined ―qualifying child‖ differently, but in 2005, the definition of 
qualifying child was consolidated to a single definition.
22
 To qualify, a 
child must satisfy four tests: 
• Relationship—the taxpayer‘s child or stepchild (whether by blood 
or adoption), foster child, sibling or stepsibling, or a descendant 
of one of these. 
• Residence—has the same principal residence as the taxpayer for 
more than half the tax year. Exceptions apply, in certain cases, for 
children of divorced or separated parents, kidnapped children, 
temporary absences, and children who were born or died during 
the year. 
• Age—must be under the age of nineteen at the end of the tax year, 
or under the age of twenty-four if a full-time student for at least 
five months of the year, or be permanently and totally disabled at 
any time during the year. 
• Support—did not provide more than one-half of his/her own 
support for the year.
23
 
 
 21. When you consider the added effect parent-child exchanges would have, an even stronger 
bias towards married couples with children is seen. 
 22. I.R.C. § 152 (Lexis 2008). 
 23. Id. § 152(c). 
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For federal tax purposes, only the birth or adoptive parent(s) and 
their spouses will be able to have a ―qualifying child.‖ This means that 
for purposes of 
• head of household status,24 
• the exemption for a dependent,25 
• the child tax credit,26 
• the child and dependent care credit,27 
• the earned income tax credit,28 
• the HOPE and lifetime learning credits,29 and 
• the credit for adoption expenses,30  
only those with children may claim these benefits. 
 
c.  Transfers. As mentioned earlier, a married couple, in addition to 
being able to income split, may also exclude all transfers within the 
marriage unit.
31
 With non-spouses, the tax code treats transfers between 
individuals as compensation, gifts, loans, etc. In other words, for a 
married couple, intraspousal transfers are non-tax events.
32
 For any other 
couple, transfers are viewed as if the parties are strangers to each other.
33
 
 
d.  Estate and gift tax benefits. A married couple also enjoys several 
estate and gift tax benefits, including the spousal gift deduction and gift 
splitting.
34
 These mechanisms allow spouses to act as one taxpayer with 
double the benefits. The spousal gift deduction under I.R.C. § 2523 
allows spouses to transfer an unlimited amount of property or cash to one 
another without recognizing a tax. Same-sex couples cannot take 
advantage of this statute, and therefore all their intra-relationship 
transfers may be subject to gift tax.  
Gift splitting under I.R.C. § 2513 gives married couples the 
advantage of allowing them to split any gift given by one spouse as if it 
was given by both. Therefore if Andy gave a $19,000 gift to a friend, 
then he would be able to split the gift, utilizing both Andy‘s and Ann‘s 
 
 24. Id. § 2(b). 
 25. Id. § 152(a). 
 26. Id. § 24(c). 
 27. Id. § 21(b). 
 28. Id. § 32(c). 
 29. Id. § 25A(f). 
 30. Id. § 32. 
 31. Id. § 1041. 
 32. This is true even in divorce. See, e.g., Katherine D. Podris & Gary J. Podris, Internal 
Revenue Code Section 1041 Is Not a Model of Tax Reform Legislation, TAXES—THE TAX 
MAGAZINE, June 1991. 
 33. See infra Part III.B. 
 34. I.R.C. § 2523 (Lexis 2008). 
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annual exclusion of $12,000, so he could exclude the entire $19,000 gift. 
If Andy was not married then he would only be able to exclude $12,000 
and $7,000 would be subject to a gift tax. This would be the case in 
relationships that are not viewed as marriage by the federal government. 
 
B.  Policy Behind the Tax Benefits 
 
The presence of a marriage penalty or a marriage bonus has troubled 
tax scholars for decades. The problem lies in balancing three competing 
goals. As Professor Bittker has written, ―[i]n short, we cannot 
simultaneously have (a) progression, (b) equal taxes on equal-income 
married couples, and (c) a marriage-neutral tax burden.‖35 If we have a 
marriage-neutral system, then a couple would pay the same tax whether 
they were married or not. That would favor the two-earner couple but 
harm the single-earner couple, since for the same amount of income, the 
two-earner couple has spread that income over two individuals‘ brackets. 
Favoring equality we dismiss neutrality, since we treat the married 
couple as a unit; we must then accept marriage penalties or bonuses. We 
could have both equality and neutrality, but we would have to toss our 
progressive rate scheme out the window. 
Tax scholars straddling other fields have made numerous suggestions 
about how best to balance these goals. Some scholars have proposed 
doing away with joint filing,
36
 while others have suggested that perhaps 
it is not the married couple, but rather an ―economic unit‖ that should 
have income splitting.
37
 
In view of these suggestions, or maybe despite them, it may well be 
that we have gotten ahead of ourselves. Having an ideal tax system, or 
even a tax system that addresses similarly situated taxpayers in an equal 
manner, is a worthy goal. However, having the tax system drive, or 
perhaps even motivate, social behavior may be beyond its ability. As 
Professor Alstott has said, speaking with regard to feminist tax 
advocates: 
 
Despite proponents‘ claims, it is extremely difficult to use tax law rules 
to change the division of family labor within the household, to improve 
women‘s economic well-being, or to increase women‘s financial power 
 
 35. Bittker, supra note 7. 
 36. See, e.g., Pamela Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax 
Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1980); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, 
Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63 (1993); McCaffery, supra 
note 8; Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV 339 (1994). 
 37. Shari Motro, A New I Do: Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L. REV. 
1509 (2006). 
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within the family. This constraint is not unique to tax law, but instead 
reflects the limited capacity of legal rules governing financial 
entitlements to change deeply entrenched social norms about gender 
roles.
38
 
 
If the tax law does not drive societal norms, then what is the purpose? 
 
Instinct in each of these first three functions of family law [protection, 
organization, and facilitation] lies a relatively commonplace idea: 
There are people (particularly children) the law is widely expected to 
protect, contracts it is widely expected to facilitate, and disputes it is 
widely expected to arbitrate. However, the last two functions of family 
law are less self-evident and more controversial. The first of these is the 
expressive function. . . . 
Finally, in the channelling function the law creates or (more often) 
supports social institutions which are thought to serve desirable 
ends. . . . Generally, the channelling function does not specifically 
require people to use these social institutions, although it may offer 
incentives and disincentives for their use. Primarily, rather, it is their 
very presence, the social currency they have, and the governmental 
support they receive which combine to make it seem reasonable and 
even natural for people to use them. Thus people can be said to be 
channelled into them.
39
 
 
We can look at the current filing status regime with this lens: Since 1938 
we have had joint liability for spouses, and since 1948 we have had joint 
filing. Whatever the current mix of marriage penalties and bonuses, the 
tax law has mirrored society‘s preference for marriage, and not for just 
any marriage. 
Since there is generally a marriage penalty for two-earner couples 
(which is most pronounced when both spouses earn about the same 
amount), we can say that current law favors the single-earner couple. 
Coupled with the other provisions of the code dealing with families and 
children,
40
 we see that the favored status is that of a single-earner couple 
with children. 
 
 
 
 38. Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 
96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2005 (1996). 
 39. Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 
497–98 (1992). 
 40. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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1.  Who benefits? 
 
Marriage is a particular arrangement belonging to three parties—the 
husband, the wife, and the state.
41
 Society agrees to view the marriage as 
one legal entity created by a three-way contract involving the wife, 
husband, and society. The tax code still takes that approach today with 
joint filing of married couples. Blackstone did not ascribe this as a 
natural state of affairs, but rather a creation of society for the benefit of 
society.
42
 ―Establishment of marriage in all civilized states is built on this 
natural obligation of the father to provide for his children; for that 
ascertains and makes known the person who is bound to fulfill this 
obligation.‖43 
Blackstone tells us that the reason for creating a single-family unit in 
the eyes of society is to provide for children. In fact, one key goal of 
society is to provide for having children.
44
 
 
First, the Legislature could rationally decide that, for the welfare of 
children, it is more important to promote stability, and to avoid 
instability, in opposite-sex than in same-sex relationships. Heterosexual 
intercourse has a natural tendency to lead to the birth of children; 
homosexual intercourse does not. Despite the advances of science, it 
remains true that the vast majority of children are born as a result of a 
sexual relationship between a man and a woman, and the Legislature 
could find that this will continue to be true. The Legislature could also 
find that such relationships are all too often casual or temporary. It 
could find that an important function of marriage is to create more 
stability and permanence in the relationships that cause children to be 
born. It thus could choose to offer an inducement—in the form of 
marriage and its attendant benefits—to opposite-sex couples who make 
a solemn, long-term commitment to each other.
45
 
 
 
 41. In re Lindgren, 43 N.Y.S.2d 154, 170 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (―There are three parties to every 
marriage contract—the two spouses and the state.‖), aff’d, 46 N.Y.S.2d 224 (App. Div. 1943), aff’d, 
55 N.E.2d 849 (N.Y. 1944); Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 114 (W. Va. 1985) (―[T]he state is a third 
party to any marriage contract.‖). 
 42. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *447. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Jonathan Head, Japan Sounds Alarm on Birth Rate, B.B.C. NEWS, Dec. 3, 2004,  
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4065647.stm (―The decline in Japan‘s birth rate 
is so severe they have invented a word for it—‗shoshika,‘ meaning a society without children. 
Unless women here start having more babies, the population in Japan is expected to shrink more 
than 20% by the middle of this century. Nearly half would be elderly, placing impossible burdens on 
the health and pension systems.‖). 
 45. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 359 (N.Y. 2006). 
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Our tax code assists the married unit by giving benefits, such as tax 
credits, to a family unit. The tax benefit given is because of the child and 
the purpose of this benefit is to directly help the child.
46
 
 
2.  Conclusion 
 
There may be a marriage bonus, as seen above by comparing the tax 
liability of Ann and Andy with that of Clyde. That marriage bonus is 
greater if one spouse does not work.
47
 The rationale behind this: the tax 
law gives the greatest benefit to those marriages best designed to be 
traditional families. In fact, we could sum up this channeling purpose as 
follows: the marriage benefits belong to families with children. 
 
III.  TAXATION OF SAME-SEX COUPLES 
 
Unlike traditional married couples, same-sex couples have no 
inherent tax advantages. Instead, they face a number of disadvantages 
natural to any unmarried couple living together, and a number of hidden 
problems brought on by recent changes in state law. 
 
A.  DOMA 
 
In 1996, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act, which 
provides: 
 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, 
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and 
agencies of the United States, the word ―marriage‖ means only a legal 
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the 
word ―spouse‖ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a 
husband or a wife.
48
 
 
Its stated purpose reflects congressional concern that legalizing same-sex 
―marriage‖ would lead to problems with interstate relations, federal laws, 
 
 46. See Leah Ward Sears, The “Marriage Gap”: A Case for Strengthening Marriage in the 
21st Century, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1243, 1244 (2007) (―Thus, we should explore how the law can 
preserve and expand the protections and benefits marriage promises to our children and 
communities.‖). 
 47. That is not to say that the law subsidizes the stay at home parent. Should Betty (the 
spouse in the second case) quit her job, the couple would find itself $30,000 less rich. However, the 
tax law would then equate Betty and Bob with couples that make $30,000 a year, and compared to 
them, Betty and Bob get a large marriage bonus. 
 48. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 1105, 100 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
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the institution of marriage, traditional notions of morality, and state 
sovereignty.
49
 Although DOMA produced a body of law reviews on its 
own,
50
 it has not been successfully challenged in court.
51
 DOMA 
effectively ends the argument about same-sex marriage with respect to 
federal law and federal tax benefits. 
 
B.  Income Tax 
 
If, for federal tax purposes, a same-sex couple is not married, then 
what is their status? Generally speaking, the ―couple‖ is two single 
taxpayers. No election to file jointly is available. No income splitting is 
available. 
The impact of this limitation can be illustrated with a simple 
example. Stacey and Tina live together. While each maintains her own 
checking account and pays her own bills, Stacey is a chef-in-training and 
Tina runs a landscape design business; therefore, they agree that Stacey 
will do the cooking and Tina will care for the yard. How does the tax law 
view this arrangement? 
If a married couple that elected to file jointly were to engage in the 
same transaction, the law would not care about the tax consequences. 
This, strangely enough, has less to do with tax law than it does reliance 
upon the legal autonomy of family relations. The earliest examples of 
this involve two cases heard by the Board of Tax Appeals. In Burkhart v. 
Commissioner, the husband attempted to pay his wife for her duties as a 
housewife.
52
 In Appeal of Robinson, the wife attempted to pay her 
husband for giving up his seafaring life.
53
 In both cases, the court ignored 
the payments. In both cases, the court assumed that there could be no 
income realized by the transferee, and the Robinson court made this 
conclusion about the attempted transfer: 
 
It is also argued that, in case the entire amount of the trust income is 
determined to be income to the taxpayer [wife], the part thereof going 
 
 49. H.R. Rep. No. 104-664 at 1–18 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905–23. 
 50. See, e.g., LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1247 n.49 (3d ed. 
2000); Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is 
Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1997); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, 
and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997); see also Mark 
Strasser, Marriage, Transsexuals, and the Meaning of Sex: on DOMA, Full Faith and Credit, and 
Statutory Interpretation, 3 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL‘Y 301 (2003). 
 51. See Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006); Wilson v. Ake, 2004 WL 
3142528 (M.D. Fla. 2004); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004); Bishop v. 
Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (N.D. Okla. 2006). 
 52. Burkhart v. Comm‘r, 11 B.T.A. 275 (1928). 
 53. Appeal of Robinson, 4 B.T.A. 504 (1926). 
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to the husband was under the contract a business expense to the 
taxpayer. We think it plain enough without discussion that this 
agreement between them was purely a family arrangement arising out 
of the marital relation, and that it was not entered into by the taxpayer 
for pecuniary profit.
54
 
 
While this comment was directed at the attempted deduction, it has been 
assumed that intramarital services do not produce income. 
At least one commentator has suggested that the same rationale 
might not apply to same-sex couples.
55
 That is certainly a reasonable 
inference, although not strictly statutory, since the exclusion for imputed 
domestic income is not statutory, but instead has a rather sketchy 
history.
56
 What this means generally is that same-sex couples may have 
imputed income from each non-gift transfer of property and from every 
exchange of services. 
 
C.  Transfers 
 
Transfers between unmarried persons can also lead to both gift and 
estate tax problems. 
 
Under current tax rules, the creation of a joint tenancy usually 
constitutes a taxable gift if the tenants‘ contributions to the purchase or 
improvement of the property are unequal. For example, if Anna makes 
a $30,000 down payment to enable Anna and Beth to purchase a home 
as joint tenants, Anna will be viewed as making a $15,000 gift to 
Beth. . . . The creation of the joint tenancy is viewed as a completed gift 
of half the value of the property because, in most cases, the donee 
tenant can sever the joint tenancy unilaterally. The severance would 
convert the joint tenancy into a tenancy in common, whereby Beth 
would own an undivided one-half interest in the property. The IRS 
maintains the position, as reflected in the Treasury Regulations, that 
 
 54. Id. at 506. 
 55. Patricia Cain, Taxing Women: Thoughts on a Gendered Economy, Symposium: The 
Income Tax: Taxing Lesbians, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN‘S STUD. 471, 477–78 (1997); Shari 
Motro, supra note 37, at 1537–38. 
 56. Smith v. C.I.R., 40 B.T.A. 1038, 1039 (1939) (―There results no taxable income from the 
performance of [a wife‘s] service and the correlative expenditure is personal and not susceptible of 
deduction.‖); Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a Comprehensive 
and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1608 (1977) (noting that benefits from 
household services and home ownership are tax free); Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. 
L.J. 1571, 1577–78 (1996). But cf. Bruce Wolk, Federal Tax Consequences of Wealth Transfers 
Between Unmarried Cohabitants, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1240, 1248–49 (1980) (stating that cohabitants 
must pay tax on exchanged services). 
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because Beth has the unilateral power to vest half the property in 
herself, Beth must be viewed as owning half the property outright from 
the time the joint tenancy was created. 
While creation of the joint tenancy is considered a completed 
transfer for gift tax purposes, it is not viewed as a completed transfer 
for estate tax purposes. Under section 2040 of the Code, if the home is 
still owned by Anna and Beth as joint tenants at Anna‘s death, the 
transfer will be viewed as though it occurred at the death of Anna rather 
than at the time of the inter vivos transfer. The specific rule of section 
2040 establishes a rebuttable presumption that the first joint tenant to 
die contributed 100% of the purchase price to acquire the property. 
Unless the presumption is rebutted, 100% of the value of the property 
will be included in Anna‘s estate at her death.
57
 
 
That same transaction, where one spouse alone pays the $30,000 
down payment on property to be held in joint tenancy, has no gift or 
estate tax consequences for married couples.
58
 
 
D.  Estate and Gift Tax 
 
Same-sex couples enjoy no benefits under the estate and gift tax. 
They do not get the benefit of the spousal gift deduction. This means that 
under current law, each gift in excess of $11,000 is taxable as a gift to 
the donor, and is counted against the donor‘s applicable exclusion 
amount. When the donor‘s applicable exclusion amount is used up, the 
gift and estate tax will kick in. 
 
E.  Number of Tax Returns Filed 
 
Quiz #1: Same-sex couples who both have income and who married 
in Massachusetts will prepare how many tax returns this April?
59
 
a. 0 
b. 2 
c. 3 
d. 4 
e. 5 
 
 57. Patricia A. Cain, Heterosexual Privilege and the Internal Revenue Code, 34 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 465, 476-78 (2000). 
 58. I.R.C. §§ 2040, 2523 (Lexis 2008). 
 59. Example taken from Eva Rosenberg, Giant Tax Headaches for Gay Couples, 
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Taxes/PreparationTips/GiantTaxHeadachesForGayCouples.asp
x?page=all (last visited Feb. 1, 2008). 
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Since May 16, 2004, Massachusetts law has permitted same-sex 
couples to marry.
60
 Massachusetts same-sex couples must file state taxes 
as married (joint or separate).
61
 However, for federal tax purposes, the 
couple is not married. For federal purposes, each spouse must file as a 
single individual. That is three returns so far. 
Massachusetts law does not have its own definition of income: 
―Massachusetts gross income shall mean the federal gross 
income . . . .‖62 Therefore, to arrive at Massachusetts gross (joint) 
income, the couple would need federal gross (joint) income. 
The correct answer is ―d.‖ The couple would prepare two federal 
returns (to be filed), a dummy federal joint return (to get the numbers for 
the Massachusetts return), and a Massachusetts joint return. 
Quiz #2: Assume the federal government repeals DOMA and 
changes its definition of marriage. If that same couple were to move to 
Utah, how many returns would they need? 
a. 0 
b. 2 
c. 3 
d. 4 
e. 5 
The correct answer is now ―e.‖ The couple would be able to file a joint 
return for federal purposes, but Utah prohibits same-sex marriages.
63
 
Since Utah, like Massachusetts, has no independent state definition of 
income,
64
 two dummy federal returns would have to be prepared from 
which to pull the state numbers and then two actual state returns would 
have to be filed. That makes five total returns. The complexity has only 
begun. 
 What if a couple moves from a state which allows same-sex 
unions to a state which does not? What if they have income from 
multiple states and need to file in each of those states? The following 
chart shows states that recognize same-sex unions or marriages: 
 
 
 
 
 60. Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 61. Mass. Dept. of Revenue, TIR 04-17: Massachusetts Tax Issues Associated with Same-
Sex Marriages, http://www.mass.gov  (search for ―TIR 04-17 and follow link) (last visited Apr. 29, 
2008). 
 62. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 2(a) (West 2008). 
 63. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29. 
 64. UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-103(1)(y) (2007). 
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State Effective date 
Type of 
union 
Joint 
tax 
return 
Highest tax rate; 
income level at 
which it applies 
CA Jan. 1, 2007 
Domestic 
partner Yes 
9.3%; greater than 
$43,467 
CT April 20, 2005 Civil unions Yes 
5%; greater than 
$10,000 
DC June 24, 1995 
Domestic 
partner Yes 
9%; greater than 
$30,000 
HI July 8, 1997 
Reciprocal 
beneficiary No 
8.25%; greater than 
$40,000 
ME July 30, 2004 
Domestic 
partner Yes 
8.5%; greater than 
$18,250 
MA May 16, 2004 Marriage Yes 5.3%; flat rate 
NJ Feb. 19, 2007 
Civil unions 
/RDP Yes 
8.97%; greater than 
$500,000 
VT Dec. 20, 1999 Civil unions Yes 
9.5%; greater than 
$336,500 
NH Jan. 1, 2008 Civil unions No? No state income tax 
 
It is not clear how couples in these states will file. For one example 
of the complexity, Connecticut‘s civil union law initially specified that 
parties to a civil union would be able to file jointly,
65
 but Connecticut‘s 
income tax statute based the tax on the federal filing status.
66
 Connecticut 
rectified this oversight with the passage of Public Act 05-03, § 58 (July 
2005). 
In each state which uses some form of the federal income as a base, 
it is common for adjustments to be made. If the federal and state tax 
systems are not aligned (as will happen when a couple is married for 
state purposes, but not for federal purposes), those adjustments can cause 
confusion as well.
67
 A continued push for same-sex recognition will only 
mean more confusion when dealing with the tax laws. For some couples, 
it will in fact mean increased costs, both direct (in terms of more tax 
liability) and indirect (for example, more returns needing to be 
prepared).
68
 
 
 
 65. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38pp (2007). 
 66. Id. § 12-700 (2007). 
 67. To name just a few areas of confusion: Will capital gains and losses for the couple be 
treated individually or netted? Will the couple be able to combine the exclusion for the gains from a 
principal residence? Which adjusted gross income figure will they use? 
 68. Moreover, you can forget using TurboTax. The popular tax software doesn‘t even touch 
this. 
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IV.  FUNCTIONALLY EQUIVALENT FAMILIES 
 
Section II.B noted that benefits were given to couples who had 
children, and that those benefits were to assist the family in raising 
children. If a non-traditional family-like unit, which is not a nuclear 
family consisting of father, mother, and children, performs the same 
functions of child rearing, shouldn‘t they get the same benefits under the 
tax code? 
The argument is appealing.
69
 There is a certain horizontal equity-ness 
to it, until you realize that what we are trying to compute is an income 
tax. That means that all income is includable, but only those deductions 
specifically given by Congress are deductible. So, generally speaking, 
only deductions that specifically relate to the production of income 
(business deductions, certain types of losses, deductions attributable to 
the production of income, etc.) are allowed. 
However, Congress has allowed for other types of deductions as 
well. These generally fit into two categories. They are either (1) totally 
capricious, have nothing to do with a rational computation of income tax 
and exist only because there was a lobbyist pushing for them, or (2) 
deductions offered for some non-governmental benefit to society, in a 
quid pro quo manner. True, there are a number of the former, but far 
more of the latter. 
Examples of deductions that are quid pro quo beneficial would 
include the deduction for charitable donations, the medical expense 
deduction, and the deduction for retirement contributions. None of these 
are necessary for the computation of an income tax. Each, however, 
serves to benefit society in a way that seems advisable to Congress. The 
charitable donations advance work that might be more efficiently done 
by organizations other than government.
70
 Medical expense deductions 
recognize that a taxpayer with truly extraordinary medical costs does not 
have the same ability to pay that other taxpayers do.
71
 Retirement 
contribution deductions encourage taxpayers to save, which in turn 
supports the economy.
72
 
 
 69. See, e.g., Linda Newstrom, Note, The Horizon of Rights: Lessons from South Africa for 
the Post-Goodridge Analysis of Same-sex Marriage, 40 CORNELL INT‘L L.J. 781, 791 (2007). 
 70. Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 
1393, 1399 n.19 and accompanying text (1988). 
 71. Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS 
L.J. 343 (1989); William Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 
309 (1972). 
 72. ―Granting a deduction to employers and employees when they contribute to a retirement 
account for the employee‘s benefit is consistent with the national policy of providing for the care and 
support for the elderly without draining the resources of the working market economy.‖ Darryll K. 
Jones, The Neglected Role of International Altruistic Investment in the Chinese Transition Economy, 
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Deductions relating to the family and children also fall into this 
category of societally bargained-for deductions. Moreover, what is the 
quid pro quo for these deductions? The Supreme Court in Skinner v. 
Oklahoma said, ―Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very 
existence and survival of the race.‖73 A society without children will 
soon die out. It therefore is a legitimate, if not vital, goal of society to 
encourage its own perpetuation through marriage and childbearing.
74
 
The justification for marital and child rearing tax benefits really 
mean nothing if there are no children involved. However, how do we 
know which marriages will produce children? What proof is required? 
How do we know that a non-nuclear family is performing an equivalent 
service to society? 
We do not require proof of intimacy to extend marriage benefits. We 
do require a child to be present for the additional child-rearing benefits to 
apply, but we certainly do not have a child rearing test (bring in your 
dirty diapers to get a credit!). So why not extend tax benefits to every 
couple? We allow elderly and infertile couples to marry and obtain tax 
benefits. Why not same-sex couples? 
The answer is found in the only question that could be asked in a tax 
system. For charitable donations, proof of the donation is required. The 
same is true for medical expenses and retirement savings. In fact, it is 
true for many of the child deductions as well: payment of the necessary 
expenses on behalf of a qualifying child will allow the deduction. 
However, the greatest number of benefits—the full range of tax 
dispensation—is reserved for those who can (1) produce and (2) rear a 
child or children. How do you substantiate that? 
It is the combination of these two roles for which society offers the 
marital tax benefits. Furthermore, in deference to personal privacy, 
society cannot ask a couple what efforts they are expending to fulfill the 
bargain. So instead, Congress adopts a bright line test: those couples who 
fit into the class of persons who could provide both roles get the benefits. 
It is that simple. Is it exact? No.
75
 The test is both over-inclusive and 
 
36 GEO. WASH. INT‘L L. REV. 71, 92 (2004). 
 73. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 74. See Steven Ozment, Diminishing Europe: The Good Life in Germany Does Not Include 
Children, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Oct. 8, 2007, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com 
/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/168gqjij.asp?pg=1 (―A society without children is a society 
without a future.‖). 
 75. See Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 868 (8th Cir. 2006) (―But under 
rational-basis review, ‗Even if the classification . . . is to some extent both underinclusive and 
overinclusive, and hence the line drawn . . . imperfect, it is nevertheless the rule that . . . perfection is 
by no means required.‘ Legislatures are permitted to use generalizations so long as ‗the question is at 
least debatable.‘ The package of government benefits and restrictions that accompany the institution 
of formal marriage serve a variety of other purposes. The legislature-or the people through the 
  
327] SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND TAXES 349 
discriminatory. It is over-inclusive in that some opposite-gender married 
couples will never have children, but yet will qualify for some of the tax 
benefits. It is discriminatory because some family arrangements that care 
for and raise children do not qualify for all the tax benefits, although they 
are given some of the benefits aimed at helping the children. Then again, 
what other test could there be, that would not throw wide open the door 
of possibility of tax gamesmanship? 
 
V.  IS DOMA SEPARABLE FROM THE TAX CODE? 
 
Policy reasons aside, the practical reason that tax benefits do not 
flow to same-sex couples currently is that DOMA removes the definition 
of marriage from state control. If DOMA were to be repealed or held 
unconstitutional, would tax benefits be available to same-sex married 
couples? 
The answer to that question is complex. Under our constitutional 
system, we would prefer to have state family law control the definition of 
a marriage. However, we have to compute a federal income tax, and we 
have two precedents in this regard where states, in their exercise of their 
sovereignty, have created confusion in the tax system. 
 
A.  Joint Filing 
 
The first precedent that has created tax problems is found in the 
history of joint filing. In the early part of the twentieth century, a 
relatively new income tax system was trying to come to grips with fairly 
taxing the nation. Complicating matters was the fact that some states 
used a common law property system, where each spouse‘s earnings 
belonged to them, while other states employed a community property 
system, which treated marital earnings as shared. A bill requiring 
mandatory joint filing was floated for a few years, but ultimately died in 
1941. In the meantime, two states, Oklahoma and Oregon, attempted to 
secure for their citizens the advantages of community property income 
sharing by enacting elective community property systems in 1939 and 
1943, respectively. 
The Supreme Court, however, struck down these attempts in 
Commissioner v. Harmon,
76
 reasoning that since the community property 
 
initiative process-may rationally choose not to expand in wholesale fashion the groups entitled to 
those benefits. ‗We accept such imperfection because it is in turn rationally related to the secondary 
objective of legislative convenience.‘‖) (citations omitted). 
 
 76. Comm‘r. v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 (1944). 
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arrangement was elective, it was no more effective than the assignment 
of income, which the Court invalidated in Lucas v. Earl.
77
 Oklahoma and 
Oregon got the message, and made their community property systems 
mandatory. The IRS approved these two states as having valid 
community property systems, and soon Hawaii, Nebraska, Michigan, and 
Pennsylvania changed their property systems as well. Other states, 
including Massachusetts and New York, apparently feeling left out, 
began to consider a change to community property. 
In 1948, faced with a growing tax disparity between married couples 
in different states, Congress faced a choice. It could revisit the 
mandatory joint filing proposal, but would now face more states 
committed to defeating it. It could legislate that income would be taxed 
to the earner, despite the state classification of community property (also 
politically unpopular). It could do nothing, which in effect would result 
in a nationwide adoption of community property laws. 
Instead, Congress passed an elective joint filing bill. This had the 
double benefit of not being a direct attack on state sovereignty, but at the 
same time, stole all the thunder from a state contemplating a change in its 
property laws for tax benefits alone. Soon after, many of the new 
community property states reverted to their old property laws.
78
 
 
B.  Limited Liability Companies 
 
The second example of a bad precedent for tax law occurred in the 
70s and 80s with the advent of limited liability companies (LLCs). 
Wyoming started this by asking the question—not unlike the question of 
legalizing same-sex marriage—what happens if we change the definition 
of a corporation? You see, we inherited corporations from the British, 
who may have stolen the idea from some other source.
79
 The corporate 
form was seen as rigid, but granted limited liability to the owners. 
Partnerships, on the other hand, were seen as flexible but lacking liability 
protection. 
In 1977, Wyoming became the first American state to enact a true 
LLC, which combined corporate limited liability with partnership 
attributes. The problem was again uniformity among the states, this time 
in terms of tax classification. 
 
 77. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). 
 78. Susan Kalinka, Federal Taxation of Community Income: A Simpler and More Equitable 
Approach, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 633, 634 n.3; Calvin G. C. Pang, Slow Baked, Flash-Fried, Not to Be 
Devoured: Development of the Partnership Model of Property Division in Hawai’i and Beyond, 20 
U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 27 n.105 (1998). 
 79. New Internationalist, A Short History of Corporations, July 2002, 
http://www.newint.org/features/2002/07/01/history-of-corporations/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2008). 
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Prior to Wyoming‘s experiment, federal taxation of business 
enterprises was primarily grouped into two categories: corporations and 
partnerships. Deciding into which category a business would fall 
involved a multi-factor test.
80
 In the years following 1977, many other 
states started to experiment with adjusting the line between corporations 
and partnerships, until the various differences in state business entities 
made interstate business planning a nightmare. It was next to impossible 
to tell whether an LLC formed in one state would in fact be treated as a 
partnership (as was usually the goal) for federal purposes, and how that 
entity would be treated in the other states where it did business. 
As the complexity started by the LLC experiment grew, so did the 
cost of doing business because tax attorneys had to be consulted for 
opinion letters with each new business formation.
81
 To fix this, the U.S. 
Treasury issued proposed check-the-box regulations on May 9, 1996.
82
 
These regulations provided a series of yes/no questions, which, when 
answered, would provide a clear classification of the type of business 
entity. The check-the-box regulations, like the elective joint return in 
1948, ended the need for states to experiment, since it provided for easier 
qualification of non-corporate entities. 
 
C.  A Post-DOMA Tax Code 
 
In a post-DOMA world, states would be free to fashion their own 
definition of marriage, to which federal tax benefits would attach. Like 
the examples of community property in the 1940s and the LLC in the 
1980s, it is likely that a serious disparity between the states would soon 
develop. In fact, it would be probable that at least one state would 
attempt to define marriage in such a way that non-cohabiting, non-family 
pairs
83
 of any description could elect ―marriage‖ simply to gain tax 
benefits. 
In such a world, Congress would again have to act to restore 
rationality. The choices facing Congress would be (1) do nothing, and 
allow all states to define marriage as broadly as they will, (2) define 
 
 80. See Morrissey v. Comm‘r., 296 U.S. 344 (1935); United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418, 
421–24 (9th Cir. 1954). 
 81. New York State Bar Association Tax Section, NYSBA Tax Section Strongly Endorses 
Check-The-Box Entity Classification Proposal, 95 Tax Notes Int‘l (TA) 172-13 (Sept. 6, 1995) 
(―[T]he ‗check-the-box‘ system would dramatically reduce interpretative and compliance burdens 
for taxpayers and the government without changing the classification outcome in very many cases. 
The Committee has therefore concluded that the Treasury does have the authority to issue 
regulations implementing the ‗check-the-box‘ system for domestic unincorporated entities.‖). 
 82. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701, 61 Fed. Reg. 21990 (May 13, 1996). 
 83. Or groups—why would the number of spouses need to be limited to two? 
  
352 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 22 
marriage for federal purposes in a way to withstand Fifth Amendment 
scrutiny,
84
 or (3) define marriage broadly itself. 
There are two arguments suggesting that Congress would choose the 
second option. The first is that either of the two other options entails a 
great deal of work. There are dozens if not hundreds of tax provisions 
implicated by the definition of marriage. Congress would either have to 
repeal all benefits for marriage or engage in a major ―marriage overhaul‖ 
of the tax code. Failure to do so would mean inconsistency and years of 
uncertainty litigating marriage benefit issues. 
The second argument is similar. A change in the tax definition of 
marriage would invite the questions ―Who qualifies and why?‖ The 
current tax benefits are tied to a societal goal. Expanding the class that 
gets those benefits begs the question of whether the benefits still advance 
the goal. That in turn, could lead to the suggestion that tax benefits for 
marriage and children be removed from the code altogether. 
While stranger results have occurred, it seems that faced with a post-
DOMA tax code, Congress would act to replace the definition of 
marriage, for tax purposes, as between a couple capable of both 
producing and rearing children. 
 
VI.  TAX LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
 
Is the definition of marriage as between a man and a woman for tax 
purposes, with or without DOMA, a violation of equal protection? The 
answer is found in the curious jurisprudence surrounding taxation. 
 
A.  Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
 
In Dane v. Johnson, in response to the suit by a citizen of 
Massachusetts, the Supreme Court said: 
 
[I]t may plainly be derived from the cases cited that since the system of 
taxation has not yet been devised which will return precisely the same 
measure of benefit to each taxpayer or class of taxpayers, in proportion 
to payment made, as will be returned to every other individual or class 
paying a given tax, it is not within either the disposition or power of 
this court to revise the necessarily complicated taxing systems of the 
states for the purpose of attempting to produce what might be thought 
to be a more just distribution of the burdens of taxation than that 
arrived at by the state Legislatures; and that where, as here, conflict 
 
 84. That is, in a manner rationally related to the purpose of the deduction. 
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with federal power is not involved, a state tax law will be held to 
conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment only where it proposes, or 
clearly results in, such flagrant and palpable inequality between the 
burden imposed and the benefit received, as to amount to the arbitrary 
taking of property without compensation—‗to spoliation under the 
guise of exerting the power of taxing.‘ 
 
Then, quoting Chief Justice Marshall, the Court continued: 
 
‗This vital power [of taxation] may be abused, but the Constitution 
of the United States was not intended to furnish the corrective for every 
abuse of power which may be committed by the state governments. The 
interest, wisdom, and justice of the representative body, and its 
relations with its constituents, furnish the only security, where there is 
no express contract, against unjust and excessive taxation; as well as 
against unwise legislation generally.‘
85
 
 
―It appears that Equal Protection does not generally apply to economic 
disparities.‖86 True, a tax that discriminates based on some suspect 
classification should be subject to equal protection claims.
87
 
 
[H]owever, the Internal Revenue Code clearly affects some apparently 
equally-situated taxpayers differently. While two taxpayers may have 
the same income, the Code treats differently the taxpayer who is 
chronically ill and incurs medical expenses, the taxpayer who suffers a 
substantial casualty loss, and the taxpayer whose income is derived 
from investments rather than labor. Those who recoup damages for 
non-physical injuries are treated differently from those who suffer 
physical injuries. Married women are treated differently than unmarried 
women by having their income taxed at a higher marginal rate owing to 
their husband‘s relatively high income. Such disparities seem not to 
have troubled the Court.
88
 
 
For example, in Kahn v. Shevin, Florida provided a $500 tax exemption 
to widows, but not to widowers. The state‘s purpose in doing so was the 
 
 85. Dane v. Jackson, 256 U.S. 589, 598–99 (1921) (citation omitted). 
 86. Leo P. Martinez, The Trouble with Taxes: Fairness, Tax Policy, and the Constitution, 31 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 413, 434 (2004). 
 87. But see Mfr‘s Hanover Trust Co. v. United States, 775 F.2d 459, 461 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(―Although the challenged IRS practice did distinguish between males and females, the gender 
classification was substantially related to the important governmental objective of promoting equity 
and fairness in estate taxes by accurately valuing reversionary interests.‖). 
 88. Martinez, supra note 86, at 434–35. 
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reduction of ―the disparity between the economic capabilities of a man 
and a woman.‖ Upholding the state statute, the Supreme Court said, 
―[w]here taxation is concerned and no specific federal right, apart from 
equal protection, is imperiled, the States have large leeway in making 
classifications and drawing lines which in their judgment produce 
reasonable systems of taxation.‖89 
In 1940, the Supreme Court said, ―in taxation, even more than in 
other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification.‖90 
This sentiment actually dates back to the year the Sixteenth Amendment 
was ratified: ―The power of exemption would seem to imply the power 
of discrimination, and in taxation, as in other matters of legislation, 
classification is within the competency of the legislature.‖91 
 
Tax legislation, then, quite plainly is unique. The extreme 
reluctance to second-guess the taxing authorities reveals the Court‘s 
implicit support for the proposition that taxes play a vital role in the 
existence and functioning of the government. . . . 
Notwithstanding the notion that fairness or equity limits the power 
to tax, the deference to legislative power is thematic, and carries 
through the Court‘s opinions on all tax matters. What we are left with, 
whether satisfactory or not, is that ‗the Constitution grants legislators, 
not courts, broad authority (within the bounds of rationality) to decide 
whom they wish to help with their tax laws and how much help those 
laws ought to provide.‘ Accordingly, ―[t]he ‗task of classifying persons 
for . . . benefits . . . inevitably requires that some persons who have 
almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different 
sides of the line,‘ and the fact the line might have been drawn 
differently at some points is a matter for legislative, rather than judicial, 
consideration.‖
92
 
 
B.  Fifth Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process 
 
The preceding cases dealt with the Fourteenth Amendment‘s 
application to state tax laws. By its terms, the clause restrains only state 
governments. However, the Fifth Amendment‘s due process guarantee, 
beginning with Bolling v. Sharpe,
93
 has been interpreted as imposing the 
same restrictions on the federal government. ―Congress and not the 
 
 89. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974). 
 90. Madden v. Commonwealth, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940). 
 91. Citizens‘ Tel. Co. v. Fuller, 229 U.S. 322, 329 (1913). 
 92. Martinez, supra note 86, at 437–38. 
 93. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
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courts has the right to select the measure and objects of taxation and such 
taxes are valid unless constitutional provisions are violated.‖94 
In 1996, Congress changed the rules regarding exclusion of tort 
recoveries. In upholding the change, the Court stated, 
 
Because the statutory provision in question does not ―interfere with the 
exercise of a fundamental right, such as freedom of speech, or employ a 
suspect classification, such as race,‖ the distinction that it creates is 
constitutional as long it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate 
government purpose. The legislature has particularly broad discretion 
in creating distinctions in tax statutes, and ―is not bound to tax every 
member of a class or none. It may make distinctions of degree having a 
rational basis, and when subjected to judicial scrutiny they must be 
presumed to rest on that basis if there is any conceivable state of facts 
which would support it.‖ ―The burden is on the one attacking the 
legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which 
might support it.‖
95
 
 
This leaves us with two conclusions. First, although an argument 
may be made for inclusion of ―functionally equivalent‖ families in the 
tax benefits provided to traditional families, the legislature may, 
nonetheless, draw the line at families who are capable of producing 
children. Such a distinction, while discriminatory, is not sufficient to 
implicate equal protection concerns.
96
 
 
The second is related to the first. Same-sex couples, whether with 
children or without, are not similarly situated to opposite-sex couples in 
the eyes of the tax law. As a result, given the unique position of tax law 
with respect to judicial deference, no challenge to the classification of 
traditional families as preferential would prevail. 
 
 
 
 
 94. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 167 (1911). 
 95. Young v. United States, 332 F.3d 893, 895–96 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
Tax law prefers traditional married couples with children. The range 
of benefits runs from cradle
97
 to grave,
98
 including child tax credits, 
adoption credits, dependent care credits, education credits, and spousal 
transfer deductions. Some benefits that are specifically designed to help 
the child are available equally to single parents or same-sex couples. 
However, the full range of tax benefits—including tax-free spousal 
transfers—is available only to opposite-sex married couples. 
The tax law encourages individuals to marry and have children, not 
because it is an essential component of the tax, but because it is an 
essential part of society. Other types of couples or individuals may 
choose to have children, and some may choose to raise children born to 
others. Some opposite-sex married couples may not choose to have 
children at all, and some may be lousy parents. However, the tax law 
does not involve itself in interviewing prospective parents regarding their 
plans to have children or their child-rearing skills. Instead, the tax law 
implements society‘s desire to provide an incentive for that institution 
which seems best suited to perpetuate society—the traditional family. 
Within the traditional family, the combination of the potential for a 
stable relationship, the ability to procreate, and the environment to rear 
children has resulted in a package of tax benefits. Even though individual 
benefits may be claimed by others due to imitation of some of the roles 
filled by the traditional family, only the traditional family justifies this 
tax accommodation. 
A same-sex couple may not have a child without involving a third 
party, which is not the same for an opposite-sex couple. The same-sex 
couple also lacks a parent of one gender. An unmarried opposite-sex 
couple is also different from a married couple, for while they may have 
children without the involvement of a third party, there is a risk that one 
party may leave the relationship without notice. Risks do exist in every 
parenting relationship, but the tax law does not require mathematical 
precision to extend benefits. In guessing which types of couples will 
most likely produce the desired continuation of society, Congress need 
only act rationally. 
Courts and legislatures looking at other areas of the law have 
concluded that disallowing same-sex couples to be married is 
discriminatory. However, changing the definition of marriage is a 
sweeping change and implicates a host of issues, not the least of which 
 
 97. E.g., I.R.C. § 24 (Lexis 2008); I.R.C. § 23 (Lexis 2008). 
 98. E.g., I.R.C. § 2056 (Lexis 2008). 
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involves federal tax benefits. Despite what may happen in other areas of 
the law, the justification to change the tax law is not present. Same-sex 
couples may qualify for some child benefits that are available to single 
parents, but the full range of incentives are not now, nor are they likely to 
be in the future, available to same-sex couples. 
